THE MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE

Introduction

Authority

Pursuant to MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-35 and 5-3-57 (1972), the Corrections Auditor and PEER Committee reviewed the circumstances surrounding the escapes of two inmates from Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman on March 28, 1994.

Scope and Purpose

The Corrections Auditor reviewed the March 28, 1994, inmate escapes to determine security deficiencies which allowed the escapes to occur. The Corrections Auditor also sought to determine what related personnel actions the Department of Corrections (DOC) took regarding DOC employees who may not have adhered to departmental security procedures.

Method

During the course of this review, the Corrections Auditor:

• reviewed applicable state law and departmental policy;
• reviewed relevant DOC administrative and inmate records;
• interviewed Ed Hargett, State Penitentiary Superintendent;
• interviewed DOC security, classification, and vocational training personnel; and,
• inspected DOC facilities.

Overview

The escapes of Lemario Bell and Ronnie McDonald on March 28, 1994, occurred because DOC experienced a breakdown in implementation of security procedures, complicated by the fact that a DOC classification committee had reclassified dangerous inmates to medium security. This incident should not have occurred; it could have resulted in the loss of life to innocent parties.

Policies and procedures are in place to prevent this type of event, as well as post orders which dictate specific procedures for correctional officers (COs). The COs failed to perform their jobs properly and were complacent almost to the point of letting the unit operate itself, believing that nothing could go wrong relative to their relationship with inmates and with each other. Specifically:

• The correctional officers assigned to Unit 30A during the first shift (12:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m.) did not comply with DOC's procedures for conducting inmate body counts and unit security checks.
• The correctional officer assigned to Unit 30's south tower during the first shift (12:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m.) did not comply with DOC's procedures for conducting perimeter security checks. In addition, the correctional officer was asleep on duty.
• The correctional officer assigned to Unit 30's Control Center did not report to the Unit 30 lieutenant that the south tower correctional officer failed to make telephone reports regarding the unit's security during the first shift.

Following an internal investigation, DOC terminated employment of four correctional officers implicated in the inmate escapes; however, as of the date of this report, DOC had not taken formal personnel action against the correctional officers' shift supervisor.

Conclusion

As illustrated by this report, the integrity of the Department of Corrections' security controls can be easily compromised by the failure of security personnel to adhere to such controls completely and consistently. Although the focus of this report related to security deficiencies, other factors contributed to the escapes of Bell and McDonald. DOC classification procedures allowed Bell and McDonald, both maximum security inmates, to be housed in a medium security housing unit for educational purposes. While the Corrections Auditor did not evaluate the criteria or process used by DOC's classification committee to assign Bell and McDonald to a medium security unit, under current circumstances DOC's provision of inmate security and opportunities to inmates through educational and other programs appear to conflict. By the close of this calendar year, the Corrections Auditor plans to complete a full evaluation of DOC's classification process.

Recommendations

1. DOC should immediately take appropriate personnel action relative to all employees involved in allowing the escapes of Bell and McDonald.
2. DOC should evaluate its training and monitoring of correctional officers to ensure adherence to departmental security policies and procedures designed to prevent inmate escapes.
3. The Commissioner of Corrections should direct security staff at the state's correctional facilities to perform immediate security reviews to identify physical and procedural impediments to adequate security of inmates within the state's custody and control.

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